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A. Interpretation - Engagement is the use of particular means to influence the political behavior of a state – economic means are trade promotion and aid in the form loans or grants

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A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states~’ domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country~’s political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea~’s receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin~’s Soviet Union or Hitler~’s Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

B. The THA would increase NON-Economic ties—

\*\*DOS ~’13\*\*. US Department of State. "U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement" Office of the Spokesperson. May 2013 ~~[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/208650.htm~~]~~[MG~~]

U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement Fact Sheet Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC May 2, 2013 In 2012, the United States and Mexico signed an agreement concerning the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico. The Agreement is designed to enhance energy security in North America and support our shared interest to exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. It is built on a commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable development of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and environmental standards. Mexico is consistently one of the top three exporters of petroleum to the United States. The United States is Mexico~’s largest supplier of refined oil products, mostly coming from U.S. Gulf Coast refineries. Former Secretary Clinton and then Mexican Foreign Secretary Espinosa signed the Agreement in Los Cabos in February, 2012. Mexico ratified the agreement in April 2012. The Agreement establishes a framework that promotes unitization of maritime transboundary reservoirs. Upon entry into force, the current moratorium on oil exploration and production along the boundary in the Western Gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico will end. Mexican law currently prohibits Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) from jointly developing resources with leaseholders on the U.S. side of the boundary. Mexico opened the door to such cooperation in a 2008 energy reform law, but only if the cooperation takes place pursuant to an international agreement governing transboundary reservoirs. The Agreement takes advantage of this opportunity. The Agreement facilitates the formation of voluntary arrangements – unitization agreements – between U.S. leaseholders and Pemex for the joint exploration and development of transboundary reservoirs. It also provides appropriate incentives to encourage the formation of such arrangements if a reservoir is proven to be transboundary and a unitization agreement is not formed. Ultimately, the Agreement provides that development may proceed in an equitable manner that protects each nation~’s interests. The Agreement provides for ongoing cooperation between the two governments related to safety and the environment, and also provides for joint inspection teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both governments will review and approve all unitization agreements governing the exploration and development of transboundary reservoirs under the Agreement, providing for approval of all safety and environmental measures. Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have introduced bills that would approve the Transboundary Agreement and give the Secretary of the Interior the necessary authorization to implement the agreement. The Administration looks forward to speedy passage of the authorizing legislation. Effect of the Agreement The Agreement will enable U.S. companies to explore new business opportunities and carry out collaborative projects with the Mexican national oil company PEMEX. It is expected the Agreement will unlock areas for exploration and exploitation along the boundary within U.S. jurisdiction by providing the legal certainty companies need to invest, potentially providing increased revenues and energy security benefits that would result from increases in production. This agreement will make nearly 1.5 million acres of the Outer Continental Shelf more attractive to U.S. operators. The Department of the Interior~’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) estimates that this area contains as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. The Transboundary Agreement will also help mitigate the safety and environmental risks that would result from unilateral exploration and exploitation along the boundary.

C. Voting issue –

1. limits – they explode the topic – blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any positive interaction with another country topical. It~’s impossible to predict or prepare

2. negative ground – the economic limit is vital to critiques of economics, trade disads, and non-economic counterplans

3. Precision – it~’s key to effective policy analysis

Resnik, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, "Defining Engagement" v54, n2, political science complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.¶ The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.

=Politics Syria=

The Syria authorization will pass but it will be a tough fight - capital is key to GOP support

Cohen, 9/3/13 (Tom, "Syria war resolution faces tough challenge in Congress" CNN,

[[http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/politics/obama-syria-congress/-http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/politics/obama-syria-congress/]])

To Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution, support from the House is the biggest challenge for Obama. "There are very few moderates that are left and it~’s a highly polarized institution," he noted, adding that what amounts to a war authorization vote was likely to shake up the normal partisan line in Congress. "You could have libertarian Republicans joining liberal Democrats to vote no, just because they~’re tired of foreign adventures," West said. "It may come down to Republicans who support a strong foreign policy joining forces with Democratic moderates to give approval." A new ABC News/Washington Post poll released Tuesday showed that nearly six in 10 Americans oppose military strikes against Syria, with similar results from respondents identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans. The administration has launched what it calls a "flood the zone" lobbying effort to persuade legislators to support the resolution authorizing military strikes against Syria. This effort in Washington includes classified briefings, testimony of Cabinet members at committee hearings, and meetings with the president. Mindful of concerns that a strike on Syria will lead to a prolonged engagement, Obama said Tuesday that "this is not Iraq, and this is not Afghanistan." "This is a limited, proportional step that will send a clear message — not only to the Assad regime, but also to other countries that may be interested in testing some of these international norms — that there are consequences," the president said. At the hearing by the Senate panel he used to chair, Secretary of State John Kerry later said that "neither our country nor our conscience can afford the cost of silence." However, Obama departs on Tuesday night on a four-day trip to Sweden and Russia at a time when members of both parties clamor for him to be directly involved. With congressional elections next year, many legislators feel that the safe vote on Syria right now is to oppose the Obama resolution, CNN Chief National Correspondent John King said Tuesday. "The president has to sway and the most important people he~’ll meet with today are the House Republicans," King said. "He doesn~’t have good relationships with them, very few personal relationships with them. They don~’t trust him. They don~’t support most of his other policy initiatives." Speaking before Boehner and Cantor publicly backed Obama, King said the president needed the House GOP leadership to "lobby their own members, saying this is the right thing to do even if you don~’t agree with the president." Cantor~’s statement did just that, even taking on a popular GOP talking point that Obama had erred by previously declaring chemical weapons use a "red line" that would bring a U.S. response if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed it. "The United States~’ broader policy goal, as articulated by the president, is that Assad should go, and President Obama~’s red line is consistent with that goal and with the goal of deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction," Cantor said in the statement. "It is the type of red line virtually any American president would draw." However, Boehner~’s spokesman, Michael Steel, made clear that the speaker was leaving it to Obama to persuade legislators to support him. "It is the president~’s responsibility to make his case to the American people and their elected representatives," Steel said in a statement, adding that "all votes authorizing the use of military force are conscience votes for members, and passage will require direct, continuous engagement from the White House." Obama met Monday with two veteran Republican senators — John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina — who emerged to say they could support a more precise and robust strategy than the president initially outlined. In particular, McCain and Graham said Obama pledged increased military aid to opposition forces in Syria that would bolster their fight against al-Assad at the same time as U.S. military attacks expected to to involve cruise missile strikes on Syrian military command targets. After Obama met Tuesday with Boehner, Pelosi and the chairs of several national security committees in Congress, legislators from both parties said they expected the initial resolution proposed by the president to be revised to address their concerns. In particular, they said it would define the mission more narrowly and specify no "boots on the ground," which means no U.S. troops would be deployed to Syria. West noted that no matter what lobbying takes place, "there are some Republicans who will vote ~’no~’ just because the idea came from President Obama" because "they detest everything he stands for." Moderates, meanwhile, may face the prospect of a primary challenge from the more extremist wing of their respective party if they authorize a war resolution, he said. "Anti-war sentiment remains very strong within the Democratic Party," West said, noting that grass-roots activists on the left opposed the Iraq war at the height of post 9/11 patriotic fervor. "The idea of another foreign intervention would be of great concern to those people." In the end, West said he expects Obama~’s resolution to win approval because "the president has laid national prestige on the line." However, a House GOP leadership aide told CNN that "it is going to be a big lift to get this done." "We~’re only going to be able to help the president as much as he~’s willing to help himself," the aide said on condition of not being identified, noting Obama must be personally involved, make the case for military action and "prove that we have a military plan that will work and not drag us into the mud for a long time."

New Latin American economic engagement initiatives cause a massive loss in political capital

\*\*Isacson, 11\*\*

Adam, Senior Associate @ WOLA, Washington Office on Latin America, Areas of Expertise: Regional and Military Security Policy, Arms Transfers, Civil-Military Relations, Colombia, International Drug Policy, Mexico, Peace Processes, U.S. Assistance, Adam Isacson is a key member of WOLA~’s Regional Security Policy team. He is a leading expert on defense, civil-military relations, and U.S. security assistance to the Americas. He collaborates on Just the Facts—a constantly updated source of information and analysis of the United States~’ often troubled relationship with Latin America~’s militaries. He helped found Just the Facts in the early 1990s. Mr. Isacson has co-authored dozens of publications, including "Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy" and "Waiting for Change," which examine the increasing role of the military in U.S. foreign policy. During the 2000s, Mr. Isacson focused on Colombia, the principal destination of U.S. aid to Latin America at the time. At the end of the decade, he published "Don~’t Call It a Model," a comprehensive look at the lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia. He has testified before Congress on international drug policy, Colombia~’s conflict, U.S. military aid programs and human rights, and has organized several congressional delegations to the region. He is "among the few in Washington who genuinely affect how policy-makers in Congress and the administration shape their decisions and policy proposals," says a congressional staffer who closely follows Latin America policy. He is known for his pithy commentary, shared online daily through regular contributions to Just the Facts and other blogs. Among Latin America analysts, he has been a leader in cutting-edge use of technology for transparency, instant analysis, and advocacy. Mr. Isacson joined WOLA in 2010 after fourteen years working on Latin American and Caribbean security issues with the Center for International Policy (CIP). Before WOLA and CIP, he worked for the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress in San José, Costa Rica as a program assistant for demilitarization. 3/10, http://www.wola.org/commentary/president\_obama\_s\_upcoming\_trip\_to\_latin\_america

Though Latin Americans~’ perceptions of the United States have improved since a low point during the Bush administration, our country is no longer the central player in the economic lives of most Latin American countries, either through trade or aid. As a result, it carries much less political weight. Though it is not his intention, President Obama~’s trip will underscore that the era of unquestioned U.S. leadership has ended, as the President himself acknowledged at the 2009 Summit of the Americas, when he emphasized building an "equal partnership" with the region~’s states. In this new reality, the White House has made an astute choice of countries to visit. Each carries great symbolic value. • In Brazil, President Obama~’s discussions with President Dilma Rousseff will highlight the global power and influence of South America~’s rapidly growing giant. It may also mark a notable improvement in the tone of U.S. relations with Rousseff~’s government, which assumed power in January. • In both Brazil and Chile, President Obama will recognize the success of long, difficult transitions from military dictatorship to democracy. Both countries are still trying to uncover the truth about the mass human rights abuses committed before those transitions began, and to hold the worst abusers accountable. The President would do well to acknowledge these important efforts. • In El Salvador, the President will be commemorating a successful transition from all-out civil war to stable peace, with a democracy so healthy that, following its 2009 elections, it underwent a smooth transition of power to the opposition: the party of the former guerrilla insurgency. President Obama~’s trip is also important for what it is not "about." This is not a visit driven by U.S. threat perceptions. Except for where it touches discussions of public security and organized crime, drugs — and the U.S. "war" on them — are not on the agenda. Nor should we expect much discussion of terrorism, Iran or even Venezuela. The focus on opportunities instead of threats is very welcome. Not all of the messages will be positive, however. In a time of reduced power and deep budget cuts, President Obama will be arriving largely empty-handed. There is relatively little new economic aid to offer; much of what the Administration can propose is re-programming to meet priority needs, improved coordination, and technical assistance. These are important, but not a substitute for new assistance and new initiatives. Not only can we expect few offers of new economic aid, we can expect few commitments to spend substantial political capital. The administration, though supportive, is unlikely to make a major political commitment to help Latin America address what, according to opinion polls throughout the region, are its main concerns: public security, unemployment, weak institutions, and migration. While crime and violence will be mentioned in Brazil and El Salvador, the most President Obama is likely to offer is a commitment to maintain modest existing levels of assistance for police and judicial institution-building. On the economy and jobs, the President will visit Chile and Brazil, whose growth rates dwarf our own. In his visit to El Salvador, whose economy is only beginning to recover from the financial crisis that hit the United States, the President is likely to support targeted anti-poverty efforts, but no major new initiatives. Strengthening institutions requires supporting reformers both in government and civil society, including human rights defenders and leaders of unions and social movements — something on which the U.S. record is mixed. On migration — a third-rail political issue in today~’s Washington — we can expect little. (El Salvador seeks a long-term resolution of the status of the two hundred thousand Salvadorans still here on a "temporary protected" basis, but no immediate solution is at hand.) We will hear words like "partnership" and "engagement" used quite heavily and repeatedly in the course of this trip. This is certainly the right tone to take. But those words have little meaning, though, if they don~’t come with a commitment to expend resources — both political and financial — to help our "partners" address their own concerns, even if it occasionally displeases a domestic political constituency. True partners are also willing to admit when their policies are not working, rather than forge blindly ahead as we have done in Cuba, the drug war, our trade policy and elsewhere. Latin America no longer revolves around the U.S. "sun," and our policy toward the region can no longer act as though it does. Let~’s hope that the tone and content of the President~’s visit reflect that.

Capital is finite and Syria requires all of it – the plan burns his leverage and consumes docket time and energy

Brown, 9/4/13 (Carrie, Politico, "Obama~’s capital spreads thin"

[[http://m.politico.com/iphone/story/0913/96306.html-http://m.politico.com/iphone/story/0913/96306.html]])

President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform. Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities. A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won~’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval. "The only effect is — and I don~’t mean this to be dismissive in any way — it will be taking up some time and there be some degree of political capital expended by all," said Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the Foreign Relations Committee ranking member who helped draft the Senate resolution. "At the end of the day, it~’s a tough vote for anybody because the issue is trying to draft an authorization knowing that they~’re going to implement it." The West Wing says it~’s too early to know how Obama~’s surprise decision to seek congressional authorization will affect the rest of his agenda, but his advisers are betting that a win could usher in other domestic successes. A failed vote, however, would undoubtedly weaken him. A senior administration official said the effort could build some trust between the White House and Republicans that might ease tensions in negotiations over the budget and other issues. White House aides have long argued that success begets success. Their latest test of that theory was the broad bipartisan Senate vote for comprehensive immigration reform bill, which was supposed to compel the House to act. So far, it has not — and House Republicans don~’t think the Syria vote will be any different. "The idea that passing the authorization for use of military force in Syria would give the administration more leverage in future political debates is absurd," one senior GOP leadership aide said. "They are currently spending political capital they don~’t have." No matter how it plays out, the sudden emergence of a fight over Syria presents both political and logistical challenges for Congress and the White House. House Republicans were already grumbling about the prospect of several perilous votes this fall — first on raising the debt limit and extending government funding, then on a package of reforms to the immigration system. White House aides began hearing skepticism from Republican leaders that they could force a debt limit hike through the chamber and then press for passage of even a pared-back immigration bill. Adding a vote on military intervention in Syria could create even more friction between the Obama administration and House Republicans, as lawmakers are being put in a position of potentially voting against their party leaders. House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) are backing Obama, but the vast majority of the conference appears to oppose the resolution, at least at this point. And even before Syria took over the headlines, there was very little time on the congressional calendar to address those issues — as well as the confirmation of the yet-to-be-nominated Federal Reserve chairman. As much as Obama likes to say the White House and Congress should "be able to walk and chew gum at the same time," often they cannot.

A failed Syria vote spurs global appeasement, allied prolif, nuclear use and shreds U.S. primacy

Cohen, 9/2/13 - teaches at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. From 2007-08 he served as counselor of the State Department (Eliot, "The Stakes on the Syria Vote" Wall Street Journal, [[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432404579049261525066516.html-http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432404579049261525066516.html]])

On Saturday, when President Obama overruled his advisers, reversed his own policy and declared that he would not act against Syria until Congress has had its say, he did not—as he might have—recall Congress for that purpose. Instead, Mr. Obama said he would let the vote wait for 10 days or more. Then he promptly left the White House for the golf course. Later this week, he~’ll travel to Stockholm and then to St. Petersburg, Russia, for a G-20 economic summit. Mr. Obama~’s dwindling band of defenders insist that this decision "to seek authorization for the use of force from the American people~’s representatives in Congress" was a matter of principle which had escaped him in Libya in 2011, and that only occurred to him now after many days of plotting an air campaign against the Syrian government for its use of chemical weapons. Others, less charitably inclined, see in his Saturday announcement a mixture of unworthy motives—an outright panic when British Prime Minister David Cameron lost a war vote in the House of Commons; an unbecoming wish that Congress would give him an excuse for inaction; and an unworthy scheme to stick his enemies (as he understands them) in Congress with a responsibility he hopes to shirk. It is beside the point to assess these motives. Congress now has decisions to make. This is the argument that lies before them. The case against authorizing the use of force begins with an indictment of the administration~’s feckless policy toward Syria. Mr. Obama chose passivity two years ago when he might have tipped the balance to a then largely secular opposition. He concocted and then ignored red lines regarding the use of chemical weapons. And he has, with this latest backflip, shown himself eager to squirm out of his own commitments, even as the rhetoric of his pronouncements ("limited," "tailored," "no boots on the ground," etc.) indicates far more interest in what the U.S. will not do than what it should do, and why. The president~’s critics will further note, and correctly, that war is war, and, as such, unpredictable. As Winston Churchill put it: "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter." Despite Mr. Obama~’s statements about narrowly defined goals, precise uses of force and limited duration, it is entirely reasonable to expect that such a strange voyage may lie ahead once operations begin, and that he is singularly ill-fitted to navigate it. Finally, as a practical matter, critics can ask why the U.S. should intervene after a massacre, however hideous, of some 1,400 Syrians, when America has refused to act over the slaughter of 100,000 in the preceding two years. And, even if the U.S. strikes at Assad and helps bring about his downfall, the danger is real that having administered a defeat to the regime and its sponsor, Iran, America will hand a victory to al Qaeda. These are all serious arguments. But weightier are the counterarguments. For better or for worse, the credibility not only of this president, but of America as a global power and a guarantor of international order, is on the line. If the U.S.—after its president said two years ago that Assad must go and then, a year later, drew a red line at Syria~’s use of chemical weapons—now does nothing, profound conclusions will be drawn by a China ready to bully its neighbors, by a North Korea whose scruples are already minimal, and by an Iran that has already killed many Americans in a covert war waged against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. America~’s friends will realize that its word means nothing. As a result, they will either abandon us, or arm themselves with nuclear weapons. And these countries will be increasingly willing to wield them in a world in which they have no great ally who may be counted upon to stand by them in an hour of need. One has to suspect that the Syrian government deliberately used sarin in the Damascus suburbs while United Nations inspectors were in the capital, and on the eve of the anniversary of Mr. Obama~’s red line statement. The essence of tyranny is this message to a population: "We will impose our will on you. No one cares about your suffering, and no one will do anything to rescue you." Assad~’s message was delivered by chemical weapons of mass destruction. Civilized nations let that message remain unanswered at their peril. The U.S. now faces a twofold problem. The first is that many Americans who came of age in the past 25 years, having grown up in a world that has been shaped by U.S. primacy, take that primacy and the stability and prosperity it has brought for granted. They should not. It hangs in the balance.

Extinction

\*\*Barnett 11\*\* (Thomas, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis %26 Research Department, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, "The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads," The World Politics Review, March 7, 2011, [[http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads-http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads]])

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world~’s sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don~’t know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence — in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment~’s most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We~’ll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it~’s entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, and a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world~’s most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let~’s examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization — one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West~’s connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America~’s self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion — all the rage these days — of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we~’ve sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals — preferably with flying robots — that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization~’s advance — again, with a Chinese face — produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone~’s moral and economic distress. The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won~’t stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you know your history, that should make you nervous.

=Oil DA=

Prices rising now —- will remain above %24100 —- best and most predictive evidence

AllAfrica News 7-30 ("High Oil Prices - Boom to Some, Doom to Others", 2013, http://m.allafrica.com/stories/201307301218.html/, )

Oil prices have remained consistently high and volatile over the past few years. According to estimates, they may remain this way at least until 2014. The Brent crude spot price, which averaged 112 dollars a barrel in 2012, is projected to remain above 100 dollars a barrel. This is at an average of 108 dollars and 101 dollars per barrel, in 2013 and 2014, respectively. High oil prices may dampen the global economy, which is still struggling to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. High oil prices above 100 dollars can be explained by many factors and they may affect economies in an uneven way, with an unclear outcome for the global economy as a whole. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a 50pc increase in oil prices, due to a supply shock, would lead to a one to 1.5pc decrease in output, in many regions of the world. Rising oil prices will affect African economies differently depending on whether they are net exporters or net importers of the commodity. For oil-importing economies, high oil prices could translate into high import bills with adverse effects on inflation, production and employment. In contrast, oil-exporting economies could benefit from high oil prices, because an increase in oil revenues improves their balance of payments. In addition, price volatility may harm both importers and exporters of oil. It lowers, for instance, the predictability of marginal costs of production for companies. The uncertainty regarding their cash flows may induce companies to reduce their investments and limit job creation, which can consequently harm economic growth. Oil prices have increased since 2003, from less than 40 dollars to more than 100 dollars per barrel today. Oil prices fell sharply in 2008, before recovering steadily since then. Prices were volatile during 2011 and 2012, mainly because of the Arab Spring and events in Libya, in addition to conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. Many uncertain and conflicting factors on both supply and demand sides have contributed to the persistent high oil prices in recent years. Geopolitical factors are the main causes that drove up oil prices in producing countries. In the past decade, wars in Iraq and political tensions in the Middle East and North Africa have affected the oil market. More recently, disagreements between Western nations and Iran - one of the largest oil producers and exporters in the world - have fuelled risks of sharp disruptions in oil supplies globally. This, in turn, had a significant impact on prices of the commodity. In contrast, major oil producing countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, may not be able to boost production and instead have to cover losses elsewhere, as their capacities are reaching their limit. The decline in aggregate oil inventories and high costs of oil extraction and production are other supply-side factors affecting oil prices. Increasing demand from major emerging economies, such as China and India, has also played an important role in keeping oil prices persistently high over the past years. The Asian continent surpassed the US and is now the largest consumer of oil in the world. Despite the slowdown in economic growth in China and India, demand will remain higher. This will keep oil prices at high levels. Furthermore, as growth is resuming in the US and as the crisis in the euro area seems to be easing, global demand for oil may increase.

Plan Ramps up domestic oil production – shifting imports and causing a saudi flood

Elass et al. 10 ( The History of U.S. Relations with OPEC: Lessons to Policymakers Jareer Elass and Amy Myers Jaffe HE H ISTORY OF U.S. R ELATIONS WITH OPEC: L ESSONS TO P OLICYMAKERS By JAREER ELASS SEPTEMBER 2010 [[http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/Amy%20Jareer%20U.S.%20Relations%20with%20cover%20secured.pdf-http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/Amy Jareer U.S. Relations with cover secured.pdf]] –BRW)

The Obama rhetoric and other similar language among U.S. politicians prompted Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the former long-serving director of Saudi Intelligence and former ambassador to the United States, to write a surprisingly bl unt editorial in the September/October 2009 Foreign Policy. The editorial took the Obama administra tion and the U.S. goal of achieving energy dependence to task, noting that, "The allure of demagoguery is strong, but U.S. politicians must muster the courage to scrap the fable of energy independence once and for all." Calling the concept of energy independence "unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energyproducing and –consuming countries, alike," Prince Turki argued that there is no technology in the foreseeable future that can completely replace oil. He noted that U.S. energy needs will have to be met with a mix of both renewable and fossil fuels. For that reason, the prince suggests that the Obama administration should focus on "en ergy interdependence" rather than energy independence, as "the fates of the United States and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come." 6 Prince Turki suggested that the term "energy independence" commonly used by the United States is often used "as little more than a code for arguing that the United States has a dangerous reliance on my country of Saudi Arabia, which gets blamed for everything from global terrorism to high gasoline prices." Highlighting Saudi Arabia~’s role for the last thr ee decades of working to ensure the stability of the world~’s energy supply, Prince Turki stressed in his Foreign Policy editorial that the kingdom has invested more than %24100 billion to expand its sustained production capacity to 12.5 million b/d—enabling Saudi Arabia to accommodate the loss of the second- and third-largest OPEC producers overnight, if need be. 8 Plans for a first tranche of %2414 billion in Saudi oil investments by 2009 were aimed to achieve this rate of sustainable produc tion by now. However, this goal could only be accomplished if national oil company Saudi Aramco were successful in stemming the natural decline in its aging fields to two percent per annum. This has been hard to accomplish and the kingdom~’s sustainable production capacity is not believed to be much above 11 million b/d. 9 One major project that was supposed to replace declining production from mature fields was new production from the offshore Manifa field. The development of the Manifa field, which is supposed to reach 900,000 b/d in the coming years, is said to be at leas t two years delayed, making it harder for the kingdom to reach its sustainable oil production goals. Ma nifa is unlikely to reach more than 450,000 b/d by 2013, and achieve its target level only in 2015. Future investments are expected to be more expensive, as the kingdom has completed expansion of projects involving less complex reservoirs an d now must tackle more challenging geologic areas with less porous rock. With trickier reservoirs in existing fields now needing to be tapped, Saudi Aramco expects its costs to go up. Aspirations to expand expl oration to new areas such as the deepwater Red Sea will be tech nically difficult for Saudi Aramco. By his second year in office, President Obama tempered his focus on energy independence, noting that the move from fossil fuels to clean energy will require time and be costly. Still, the president noted: "...we can~’t afford not to change how we produce and use energy—because the long-term costs to our economy, our national se curity, and our environment are far greater." U.S. Relations with OPEC 13 Indeed, the costs of trying to eliminate oil im ports in the short run would be incredibly expensive. U.S. oil imports of roughly 11 million b/d are the equi valent of 18.7 terawatt hours of energy. To replace all of this imported oil with no n-fossil energy sources would be the equivalent of adding almost eight times the current U.S. total capacity for nuclear power generation (assuming 24-hour, 100 percent operations). The United States currently operates 103 nuclear plants. There are also more than 250 million oil fuel-based motor vehicles in the United States. On average, Americans retire 75 percent of moto r vehicles over a sevenyear period. Thus, the infrastructure demands alone in shifting the equiva lent of 18.7 terawatt hours of oil based energy use are immense, both in terms of scale and timeline for retiring exis ting motor vehicle and energy production facility stocks. U.S. President Barack Obama and OPEC OPEC members may have applauded the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency much like the majority of th e international community did in November 2008, but the group made it evident early on that OPEC doesn~’t see eye-to-e ye with President Obama on the energy platform that he espoused during the American presid ential campaign—including a commitment to once and for all eliminate American dependence on foreign oil. Given the scale up and timing issues, as reflected in Prince Turki~’s op ed, leaders from OPEC oil producing countries remain skep tical of the Obama administra tion~’s push for renewable energy development, electric cars, and the administration~’s initially ambiti ous commitment to slash U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and support a gl obal climate treaty. OPEC~’s best defense against alternative energy would be to drop the price of oil to levels that would render alternative energy as commercially unprofitable. But the producer group is not currently actively concerned about the threat of alternative energy or electrification of the transportation sector because it doesn~’t believe that such technologies can be scaled up commercially to a significant level within the next twenty or thirty years. OPEC leaders are more concerned that a U.S. or global climate regime not tax or penalizes petroleum in a substantial fashion that significantly disadvantages oil-based fuel. A U.S. border carbon tax that h its all U.S. imports, including oil imports from Saudi Arabia, might be viewed as a more serious trade problem than U.S. policies to promote alternative energy. But so far, OPEC has not had to worry too mu ch about the Obama admi nistration moving ahead forcefully with overly ambitious energy and clim ate policy plans. Instead, the new administration has been hamstrung with a struggling U.S. econo my. The administration~’s long struggle to pass major health care reform between 2009 and the spring of 2010 has dampened its chances of passing substantial climate legislation either late r this year or into ne xt year, and President Obama has also had to cope with the fallout fr om the weak accord produced from the December 2009 U.N. climate talks held in Copenhagen. Thus, OPEC~’s charge has been mainly focused on reacting to prospects that tightened fuel economy standards will curb growth in oil use in the U.S. market over time. Less than two months after the U.S. presiden tial inauguration, OPEC signaled goodwill toward President Obama when the group convened in Vienna in March 2009 to assess market conditions and steered clear of approving new supply reduc tions. OPEC seemed reluctant to send the Obama administration a negative signal at such an early stage. And, the group gave strong consideration to the impact that a cut in out put would have on a str uggling global economy. Key OPEC leaders were also cautious that the organi zation~’s deliberations not appear to undermine a critical G-20 heads of stat e summit the following month.

Oil prices key to the Russian economy

Schuman ~’12 (Michael, Asia and Economics Correspondent – TIME, B.A. in Asian History and Political Science – University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Affairs – Columbia University, "Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices", Time, 7-5, http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/, Deech)

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world~’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China~’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia~’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia~’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government~’s revenues. What~’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of %2455 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to %24120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near %24100 and U.S. crude less than %2490. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin~’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation~’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

Russian economic decline causes nuclear war

Filger ~’9 (Sheldon, Correspondent – Huffington Post, "Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction", http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation~’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia~’s economic crisis will endanger the nation~’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama~’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation~’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

=Border Infrastructure CP=

Plan Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement with Mexico to facilitate improved efficiency and reduced congestion along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Bilateral border investments are the key internal link to U.S.-Mexico relations.

\*\*Baker Institute 9\*\* — The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University—a nonpartisan public policy think tank, 2009 ("Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and Secure Relationship," Baker Institute Policy Report, Number 38, April, Available Online at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecPREnglish-041509.pdf, Accessed 07-26-2013, p. 1)

The relationship between the United States and Mexico has historically been a strong one, but internal politics in both countries today are preventing a potentially closer and more productive alliance. Problems at the border loom large in the political calculation of decision makers both in Washington, D.C., and Mexico City.

Daily news reports seem to imply that problems developing at the border stand to derail common goals. However, it is our contention that the exact opposite is true. Creative localized solutions to the challenging set of issues that surround the U.S.–Mexico border could hold the key to building a stronger overall bilateral partnership and constructive joint future, rather than serve as the flashpoint for tensions between the two neighbors. Both Mexican President Felipe Calderón and U.S. President Barack Obama have a unique opportunity in the next four years to advance common goals such as economic prosperity and security.

This report on the U.S.–Mexico border aims to aid policymakers in forging stronger and sustainable U.S.–Mexico bilateral relations with the use of more coordinated approaches to border issues. Sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas, this study investigates the important role of border institutions, civil society, cross-border transnational populations, and localized, small-scale problem-solving as a first defense against the deteriorating conditions at the border—be they humanitarian, economic, or security-related. By better understanding life along each side of the U.S.–Mexico border, we hope to demonstrate the great potential of this vibrant region to play a positive role in both the U.S. and Mexican economies and intertwined transnational communities. Rather than represent a zero-sum unilateral dilemma, the border can be a stepping stone toward a lasting friendship between the United States and Mexico, and positively influence citizens on both sides of the boundary. The border should be where one can best see the benefits for the two countries of collaborating and cooperating on issues of major concern. Instead, the border is increasingly becoming an area of tension, conflict, and unilateral policies and actions that are more likely to hinder, rather than promote, common goals.

Infrastructure investment rebalances the relationship — overcomes alternate causalities

\*\*Selee and Wilson 12\*\* — Andrew Selee, Vice President for Programs and Senior Adviser for the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University and of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Visiting Professor at El Colegio de Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland, an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Washington University in St. Louis, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher at American University~’s Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University, 2012 ("Getting ready for a new era in U.S.-Mexico ties," Global Public Square—Fareed Zakaria~’s CNN blog, December 3^^rd^^, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/03/Getting-Ready-for-a-New-Era-in-U-S-Mexico-Ties/, Accessed 07-26-2013)

U.S.-Mexico relations have been dominated for the past six years by efforts to address drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence. This was the right thing to do while violence spiked in Mexico, but with a new administration in office after the swearing in of President Enrique Peña Nieto over the weekend, the time has come to re-balance the bilateral relationship.

Ties tend to have the same top three items on the agenda year after year and administration after administration: immigration; drugs and violence; and trade and economic relations. Drugs and violence have dominated in recent years, and cooperation in addressing the transnational flows of drugs, arms and illicit money, as well as support for Mexico~’s efforts to strengthen public security, must continue. Although the gains are still tenuous and the situation fluid, violence in Mexico does appear to have begun to decline at a national level and major advances have been made in key border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.

Immigration dominated the early 2000~’s as presidents Bush and Fox sought a bilateral deal on the topic, but it has since become clear that immigration reform is first and foremost a domestic political issue in the United States. The rate of unauthorized immigration from Mexico has now dropped to historically low levels – there are at least as many leaving as arriving – which should allow for a more rational and reasoned debate on this issue in the United States.

However, not since the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA in the 1990s have economic relations topped the bilateral agenda. Trade and jobs should once again top the U.S. agenda with Mexico for three main reasons.

First, the economy most likely will be the top issue in both the United States and Mexico for the next several years. Economic issues were clearly the top issue for voters in the recent U.S. presidential elections, and in Mexico they matched public security as the top set of concerns.

Second, by focusing on the creation of jobs and improving the competitiveness of manufacturers on both sides of the border, we can improve the tone of the relationship. We may even find that the stickier issues of security and migration become a little less intractable.

Finally, the economic agenda between the two countries has the potential to yield tangible results, creating jobs and improving the competitive position of North America vis-a-vis Asia. For years, Mexico has oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world~’s most dynamic economy. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, Mexico~’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products.

As it turns out, U.S. and Mexican companies do not simply sell products to one another, they build products together, with parts zigzagging back and forth across the border as goods are manufactured. As a result, a product imported from Mexico is, on average, made of 40 percent U.S. parts and materials, meaning forty cents of every dollar spent of Mexican imports stays right here in the United States. Chinese products, in contrast, contain just four percent U.S. content.

This also means the competitiveness of our two countries is closely linked, and improvements in productivity in one nation make a co-manufactured product cheaper and more competitive on the global market. That is to say, growth in Mexico or the United States will boost exports from both countries: when it comes to manufacturing, we are in it together.

To produce results, the U.S.-Mexico economic agenda needs substance, and there is plenty to do. To start out, we must make the southwest border more efficient without sacrificing security. Today, long and unpredictable wait times act as a type of border tax, cutting away at manufacturers~’ competitiveness a bit more each time they send goods across the border.

Since we manufacture and export together, the United States should also join forces with Mexico and Canada in designing and implementing a global trade strategy. The first step is robust cooperation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, but the end goal must be to expand the agreement until countries like China and India feel they will lose out if they do not join in.

The countries could also tackle ways of making customs procedures more efficient, ensuring regulatory frameworks are compatible, and integrating our transportation and logistics networks to keep up with regional manufacturers, who have already integrated production.

In the end, it is a matter of perspective. If Mexico is seen more as a business partner than a source of intractable problems, a whole range of policy options that were previously considered too risky to be tried will be within reach. If such a change in perception occurs, the results will speak for themselves.

# 2nc

==Russia ==

=Impact Overview=

Magnitude: you should prefer a US-Russian nuclear war to any other impact—it~’s the only existential risk:

\*\*Bostrom 2002\*\* (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios", Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven~’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by "igniting" the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don~’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[~~[2~~]-http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[~~[3~~]-http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[~~[4~~]-http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]]  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind~’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

and to ensure that no new nuclear weapons states emerge, said Dr Fox.

==Uniqueness==

Prices rising now —- will remain above %24100 —- best and most predictive evidence

AllAfrica News 7-30 ("High Oil Prices - Boom to Some, Doom to Others", 2013, http://m.allafrica.com/stories/201307301218.html/, )

Oil prices have remained consistently high and volatile over the past few years. According to estimates, they may remain this way at least until 2014. The Brent crude spot price, which averaged 112 dollars a barrel in 2012, is projected to remain above 100 dollars a barrel. This is at an average of 108 dollars and 101 dollars per barrel, in 2013 and 2014, respectively. High oil prices may dampen the global economy, which is still struggling to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. High oil prices above 100 dollars can be explained by many factors and they may affect economies in an uneven way, with an unclear outcome for the global economy as a whole. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a 50pc increase in oil prices, due to a supply shock, would lead to a one to 1.5pc decrease in output, in many regions of the world. Rising oil prices will affect African economies differently depending on whether they are net exporters or net importers of the commodity. For oil-importing economies, high oil prices could translate into high import bills with adverse effects on inflation, production and employment. In contrast, oil-exporting economies could benefit from high oil prices, because an increase in oil revenues improves their balance of payments. In addition, price volatility may harm both importers and exporters of oil. It lowers, for instance, the predictability of marginal costs of production for companies. The uncertainty regarding their cash flows may induce companies to reduce their investments and limit job creation, which can consequently harm economic growth. Oil prices have increased since 2003, from less than 40 dollars to more than 100 dollars per barrel today. Oil prices fell sharply in 2008, before recovering steadily since then. Prices were volatile during 2011 and 2012, mainly because of the Arab Spring and events in Libya, in addition to conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. Many uncertain and conflicting factors on both supply and demand sides have contributed to the persistent high oil prices in recent years. Geopolitical factors are the main causes that drove up oil prices in producing countries. In the past decade, wars in Iraq and political tensions in the Middle East and North Africa have affected the oil market. More recently, disagreements between Western nations and Iran - one of the largest oil producers and exporters in the world - have fuelled risks of sharp disruptions in oil supplies globally. This, in turn, had a significant impact on prices of the commodity. In contrast, major oil producing countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, may not be able to boost production and instead have to cover losses elsewhere, as their capacities are reaching their limit. The decline in aggregate oil inventories and high costs of oil extraction and production are other supply-side factors affecting oil prices. Increasing demand from major emerging economies, such as China and India, has also played an important role in keeping oil prices persistently high over the past years. The Asian continent surpassed the US and is now the largest consumer of oil in the world. Despite the slowdown in economic growth in China and India, demand will remain higher. This will keep oil prices at high levels. Furthermore, as growth is resuming in the US and as the crisis in the euro area seems to be easing, global demand for oil may increase.

Momentum is neg —- will keep rising

Daily Finance 7-29 ("Oil Prices Heading Higher%21 Try This Approach", 2013, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/07/28/oil-prices-heading-higher-try-this-approach/, )

The bad news, which I had to relay to my dad, is that prices aren~’t likely to go down again anytime soon. Worse yet, drivers probably should get ready for higher gas prices. Last week~’s %240.12 jump could only be the beginning because a confluence of factors driving supply and demand are likely to push prices higher. While that~’s not what drivers want to hear, I do have a solution to help take away a little bit of the pain at the pump. What~’s driving prices higher? Before I give you my solution, let~’s take a deeper look at the problem. The average retail price of gas is made up of four components. By far, the biggest contributor to the price of gas is oil, which is two-thirds the price of gas. The price of oil is driven by both global and regional market conditions. Globally, unrest in Egypt has been a big factor in oil~’s recent rise. Believe it or not, Egypt is a big deal in the global oil market as it~’s the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa. In fact, U.S. oil and gas producer Apache is actually Egypt~’s top oil producer, creating over 363,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day. The concern is that this oil production, as well as oil being transported through the important Suez Canal, could potentially be shut off if unrest in the country turns into an all-out civil war. The global oil markets are simply factoring this potential disruption into the price of oil.

Even if they win prices are decreasing now, they~’ll bottom out at %24100 —- won~’t trigger the link

Prime-Tass Business Newswire 13 (Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire, "Russia~’s Econ Min: Oil prices to stay above %24100\bbl in 2013", 2-26)

The Economic Development Ministry expects the price of Brent oil to ease but remain above U.S. %24100 per barrel in 2013, Deputy Minister Andrei Klepach said late on Monday. "Generally, the balance shows a decline. But we are unlikely to see a sharp decrease. Oil prices are likely to decline slightly, but to stay above %24100 per barrel," Klepach said. The ministry~’s 2013 forecast for the price of Urals crude, Russia~’s main export item, stands at %2497 per barrel, but it has not ruled out that the price may rise above %24100. In 2012, the average price of the Urals blend amounted rose 1.15% to %24110.52 per barrel. Klepach said that the current level of oil prices of around %24115 per barrel of Brent mix is above the ministry~’s expectations, he said.

of the oil price. If the situation can be contained, global crude oil is expected to range between %24100 and %24110 per barrel.

===1nc Prices===

====Increasing Mexican oil production would lower oil prices globally ====

MM, 12 ("Oil Prices Promise to Head Higher As Mexican Production Dwindles", Money Morning, moneymorning.com/2012/08/24/oil-prices-promise-to-head-higher-as-mexican-production-dwindles/ //kdh)

Mexico is currently ranked No. 7 on the list of the world~’s top oil producers, so less Mexican oil production would also mean higher oil prices worldwide. The loss of Mexico~’s 1 million barrels a day in exports over an extended period would be a greater blow than the total lost due to sanctions on Iran. While the effects of Mexico~’s lagging oil production are clear, the causes are more complex. The root of the problem is years of neglect and a government-enforced monopoly. Nationalized in 1938, Mexico~’s oil industry has prohibited oil behemoths like Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM), BP (NYSE ADR: BP) and others from taking any sizable stake in the country~’s oil operations. If it allowed more investments from international oil companies, Mexico could revive production, industry analysts say. But that won~’t be easy. Petroleos Mexicancos, PEMEX, has sole control of the Mexican oil industry and doles out over 32% of its revenue to Mexico~’s government. But while the Mexican government likes the oil revenue, it has failed to re-invest enough money back into the industry. Mexican lawmakers have long resisted providing PEMEX with the funds needed to find new sources of crude. Of late, PEMEX has moved to relax its oil monopoly, allowing foreign firms to bid for PEMEX contracts. Aspokesperson for PEMEX said these new efforts, in addition to the current doubling of its budget, would allow the company to quickly boost production. But PEMEX~’s director of operations Carlos Morales told Reuters the company is extremely cautious and prudent when calculating the prices it is willing to pay firms to develop oil field as agreed on in new contracts. "We can~’t leave money on the table. We also can~’t set very low prices... because we may be left without any offers, just like what happened with ~~[oil field~~] Arenque." The inability to auction off the Arenque oil field raises the question of just how committed PEMEX is to expanding private sector involvement. As long as PEMEX drags its feet, Mexican oil production will keep slipping. "The next government may want an opening, but PEMEX loves being a monopoly," Miriam Grunstein, an energy researcher with Mexico~’s CIDE Institute, told Reuters. But because oil is so vital to the Mexican economy, both PEMEX and the Mexican government may eventually be forced to adjust their thinking. "The fact that Mexico~’s production is rapidly declining could potentially cause a financial crisis not only for PEMEX but for the government," Enrique Sira of energy consulting form IHS told the NYT. "As you lose Mexican oil, you lose critical supply. It~’s not about energy security but national security, because our neighbor~’s economic and political well-being is largely linked to its capacity to produce and export oil," Jeremy M. Martin, director of the energy program at the University of California, San Diego told The New York Times.

====Investing in Mexican oil would substantially decrease U.S. dependence on Middle East ====

Ahdoot et. al, 1 (Jason D. Ahdoot, Attorney at the Law Offices of Jason D. Ahdoot, Masters in Public Policy from Pepperdine University School of Law, David Vela, Charity Morsey, "Alleviating U.S. Dependence on OPEC", Pepperdine University School of Public Policy, April 2001, publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/master-public-policy/content/capstones/opec.pdf //kdh)

If the U.S. invests more money in countries that have proven reserves, it may be able to lessen dependence on oil from OPEC and safeguard itself from an oil shortage at a time of crisis or economic disruption. The U.S. could invest in domestic production capacity, as well as production and refining facilities abroad. Currently, non-OPEC production is concentrated in seven countries including Canada, UK Mexico, Norway, China, Russia and the US. Currently, the Bush administration has called for an expansion in imports of petroleum from Mexico. The administration calls for more privatization of the oil reserves in Mexico and more investment by U.S. oil producing companies. This makes sense because aside from the fact that Mexico is one of our closest neighbors, we have a bilateral trade pact that would facilitate the export of oil, creating a relatively safe investment opportunity. In a recent study, the British Petroleum Statistical Review, Mexico has 28.4 million barrels of proven oil reserves as of 1999. Contracts with Mexico for the importation of oil to the U.S. have been on the rise since 1994.37 This capacity has been furthered with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA has pierced through many jurisdictional barriers, allowing Americans to enjoy the importation of Mexican petroleum. Because Mexico has large proven reserves, and the U.S. has such a high demand for petroleum, we should be able to facilitate a mutually beneficial relationship. In Mexico, privatization of the nationalized petroleum industry may be a challenge, but the current administration has promised to help Americans with their energy crisis. PEMEX has long been the existing monopoly, and the Mexican Constitution stipulates that natural resources such as oil and gas must remain nationalized. In hopes of liberalizing a sector of this monopoly and amending the constitution, newly elected Mexican President V. Fox has appointed four of Mexico~’s wealthiest businessmen to the PEMEX board. The U.S. government in this instance can opt to invest in Mexico~’s energy sector via NAFTA negotiations. If so, NAFTA will be renegotiated in the year 2007. This could serve as an opportunity for the US to propose plans for a more integrated energy trade and regional self-sufficiency strategy. The precursors for establishing a regional trade agreement with Mexico already exist within the political and economic framework of the Mexico-U.S. NAFTA partnership. These policies are a benchmark for the development of "geographical linkages for self-sustenance." An investment in Mexico would mitigate the impact of aggressive policies by the Middle East and its destabilizing surprises.

====U.S. imports from Mexico would decrease prices====

CNN, ~’12 ("For more oil, U.S. should look to Mexico", CNN, 3/1/12, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/opinion/navarrette-gas-prices, JKahn)

San Diego, California (CNN) — For me, the issue of skyrocketing gasoline prices came into focus about four years ago, when the national average that Americans paid at the pump reached an all-time high of %244.11 a gallon. Today, the average — up 30 cents in the last four weeks, and 13 cents in the last week alone — is about %243.70. In the summer of 2008, I pulled up next to a gas pump off a major highway in Southern California where — apparently, a few minutes earlier — a recreational vehicle, which held more than 100 gallons, had stopped to fill up. The price was still on the screen: %24500. Can you imagine paying %24500 to put gas in your vehicle? For many of us, that~’s more like a monthly car payment. But for those who live in Southern California — where the car is king, public transit is spotty and the carpool lane is almost always underused — even a tab that size hardly raises an eyebrow. At the gas station closest to my home in San Diego, a gallon of gas is going for about %243.49, and a full tank costs me about %2465. I shell that out three or four times a month. Prices are sky high in Los Angeles. With the average price here expected to reach as much as %245 a gallon by Memorial Day, it~’s not surprising to see more commuters jammed onto trains and hear that more of your friends are trying to work from home a few days a week. Although my friends on the East Coast like to think they have it easier with more options for public transportation, it~’s a mistake for people to assume that higher gas prices don~’t affect them. It~’s not about geography. We~’re all in this together. Have you noticed the price of groceries lately, as those companies that operate delivery trucks have to spend more to stack food on supermarket shelves? So you don~’t own a car. Maybe you take the subway to work. Swell. But if you have a mouth, and occasionally like to fill it with food, high gas prices should be hard to swallow. Meanwhile, political leaders — in both parties — need to fill up on courage and common sense in order to work on a solution. President Obama was right to say recently that there is little a chief executive can do about gas prices. That said, presidential candidates should stop promising otherwise. At the moment, our politicians seem to be running low on ideas and yet overflowing with an eagerness to exploit the uptick in prices for their own political benefit. Newt Gingrich is promising lower prices. He also pledges that, if elected president, he won~’t bow before a Saudi king. So what? What does that have to do with anything, beyond political rhetoric? At the moment, our main concern — and certainly that of our one true friend and ally in the Middle East, Israel — isn~’t Saudi Arabia but Iran. As part of a small group of Latino journalists who visited Israel last month, I was reminded by Israeli officials in one briefing after another that — were Iran to build a nuclear weapon — the e ntire world would change. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could block the Strait of Hormuz and the rest of the world would be too frightened to do anything about it. That~’s what we should be worried about, not whether U.S. presidents bow before the Saudis. It also wouldn~’t hurt to pay more attention to oil reserves in this hemisphere. Mexico is a major producer, and a friend and ally. The relationship between the United States and Mexico isn~’t perfect; tensions recur over immigration, drugs and trade. Each country has an annoying habit of blaming the other for its problems. But it~’s a strong marriage that will endure. Instead of chanting "Drill, baby, drill," more of our leaders should be saying: "Hola amigo." The U.S. government should increase oil imports from Mexico. Not only is it better to deal with friends than adversaries, it~’s also a good way to help the Mexican government fund its war against the drug cartels — a battle that is, let~’s not forget, fueled by another one of our addictions. Granted, in order for the United States to increase oil imports from Mexico, our neighbor may have to increase production. That~’s a slippery situation. Mexico nationalized the oil industry in the 20th century and foreign companies are prohibited from drilling. But that resistance seems to be weakening. Mexico~’s national oil company has allowed some private contracts and says its mature fields, which produce just 12,000 barrels of oil per day, could produce up to 220 million barrels of oil. We can have that conversation. And let~’s face it, the United States would rather work through that issue than work with countries that are hostile to Americans. Look at the polls, and you~’ll see that one of the major reasons everyday Americans think we need to become more energy self-sufficient and develop a better strategy for importing oil is that they~’re leery of becoming too dependent on countries in the Middle East that are often unwelcoming, undemocratic and unstable. After all, no matter how much we love our cars and need our gasoline, few things are scarier than breaking down in a bad neighborhood.

====despite shale Oil prices up and rise will continue====

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These days everybody wants to extol the virtues of rising U.S. domestic crude oil production. From decades of increasing reliance on foreign providers, some hardly sympathetic to American interests, the new prospect of having significant unconventional oil reserves here at home has been a major development. The assumption advanced says that domestic sources will be cheaper. As a result, this should comprise a positive boon to consumers of oil products but a problem for producers and refiners. In short, the mantra among some commentators is to proclaim the end of the oil market as an attractive option for investors. As with most such simplistic observations, however, it turns out not to be true. A number of these "analysts" are actually talking down the prospects of oil prices because they have already shorted the commodity and will benefit their own investments if they can continue the downward push. Well, oil prices are now going up, with both West Texas Intermediate (WTI) in New York and Brent in London at more than three-month highs. In addition, the spread between WTI and Brent is narrowing. The narrowing of that spread is occurring while both benchmarks are rising in price. The mantra of the pricing doomsayers would expect it to be going in the other direction. There are two broad categories of reasons why matters are not happening as the doomsayers had expected (aside from the obvious - they misunderstood the dynamics from the beginning). And once you understand both, you~’ll be in position to profit as prices continue to

=AT: trade deficit=

====Status quo solves the deficit – Horizontal drilling ====

Hamm 7/4 – CEO of Continental Resources, energy advisor to Mitt Romney (Harold Hamm, 7/4/13, "Happy (Energy) Independence Day" [[http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/07/04/happy-energy-independence-day/-http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/07/04/happy-energy-independence-day/]]) // CB

By unlocking oil and natural gas resources that were once thought to be unrecoverable, horizontal drilling has sparked an American energy renaissance that will revolutionize everything from job creation to balance of trade to national security. This advanced technology allows us to drill two miles down, turn right, go another two miles, and hit a target the size of a lapel pin. With technological advances in horizontal drilling, oil imports have dropped 26% since 2008 and the United States is likely to overtake Saudi Arabia as the world~’s largest oil producer by 2017.

Some may say this new abundance in oil and gas is due to hydraulic fracturing. However, fracking technology has been consistently in use for more than 60 years. What is new is horizontal drilling. In 2000, there were less than 50 horizontal drilling rigs in the U.S. and experts believed we had reached peak oil. In 2009, the Domestic Energy Producers Alliance issued its Declaration of Energy Independents due to the phenomenal turnaround caused by horizontal drilling. By the end of 2012, there were nearly 1,200 horizontal drilling rigs in the U.S. and Raymond James, Citi and the International Energy Agency had all released reports declaring the reality of American energy independence by 2020.

Just as the American Revolution changed the world in 1776, so too will this modern-day American oil and gas revolution. Energy independence means we no longer have to rely on oil from the Middle East, it means the creation of more than a million high-paying jobs, and it means a solution to the U.S. debt crisis through a shift in balance of trade.

Horizontal drilling has forged the path to energy independence, freeing us from unfriendly nations and financial disaster. On this Independence Day, as we look to the future of U.S. oil and gas production, we can once again celebrate the best of American innovation and perseverance brought to you by Americans at their best.

====No American investment – disclosure agreements====

\*\*Simmons 4/30 (Daniel, Director of Regulatory and State Affairs at the Institute for Energy Research, BA in economics from Utah State University, J.D. from George Mason University School of Law, Master Resource: A free-market energy blog, April 30, 2013, "U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement: A Rare Victory for Oil and Gas in the Obama Era," [[\*\*http://www.masterresource.org/2013/04/u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement/-http://www.masterresource.org/2013/04/u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement/]]\*\*, alp)\*\*

\*\*In an otherwise good agreement, \*\*one\*\* potential \*\*problem is a conflict between Article 20 of the agreement and the S\*\*ecurity and \*\*E\*\*xchange \*\*C\*\*ommission\*\*~’s Rule\*\* 13q-1 \*\*regarding Resource Extraction Payments. Article 20 states: To the extent consistent with their national laws, the Parties shall maintain confidential\*\*, and obligate their Licensees to maintain confidential, \*\*all Confidential Data and other information obtained\*\* from the other Party or its Licensees \*\*in accordance with this Agreement.\*\* Together with Rule 13q-1, requiring "resource extraction issuers" to disclose payments made to foreign governments, \*\*Article 20 can create an impossible situation for American companies operating on transboundary hydrocarbon resources. \*\*For example, \*\*Mexican confidentiality requirements may forbid the disclosure of the very information that Rule 13q-1 requires American companies to disclose. This would lead to a situation where companies regulated by the SEC have\*\*, at very least, \*\*uncertainty about compliance with both Mexican and American disclosure\*\* laws. \*\*This\*\* uncertainty and potential disclosure conflict \*\*would place foreign state-owned oil companies, who are not regulated by the SEC, at a competitive advantage\*\* to the companies which operate in the United States are regulated by the SEC. Because much of the transboundary area is deepwater, it would require multi-billion dollar investments to produce the hydrocarbon resources. An\*\*y legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could\*\* easily \*\*dissuade American companies from undertaking\*\* what is already \*\*an expensive decision\*\*, in turn \*\*reducing opportunities for new jobs\*\* for Americans. \*\*Rule 13q-1 also creates a different\*\* type of \*\*competitive disadvantage\*\* for American companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico Transboundary area. \*\*The rule would allow foreign state-owned oil companies with a competitive advantage to consider business-sensitive information about American companies~’ operations.\*\* If Mexico were to allow foreign-owned companies to extract oil along the deepwater transboundary area, \*\*there could\*\* very well \*\*be competition between U.S. private companies and foreign-state owned companies.\*\* Even though the deepwater technology was developed in the U.S. deepwater, the U.S. companies would be at a disadvantage. \*\*This is like playing poker but being required to show your cards\*\* to your fellow card-players. \*\*

====Protectionist war would be small scale if it happens====

\*\*Harrison\*\* ~’\*\*11\*\*

(Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, "Capitalism at War" Oct 19 http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)

Diversionary wars In the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with external adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite intuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders~’ desire to improve domestic standing. The idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars intended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of the origins of World War I in domestic German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that a class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to claim that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation. Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by "demagogy, deception, bribery, and force" (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80-82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea (Levy 1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999). They conclude that the use of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government~’s supporting coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensities under such circumstances (because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic conflict is high (because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of research suggests that new or incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). One inspiration for this view was the record of the new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have provided out-of-sample confirmation. Suppose diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally conflicted than other societies, and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the case of fascism seems straightforward. Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists, war was not a diversion; it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists do not seem to have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied on the image of an external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict. Soviet leaders used external tension to justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy, censorship, and surveillance. When they tolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls. An East German Stasi officer told his boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): "How can you expect me to prevent ~~[defections and revelations~~], when we~’ve signed all these international agreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of movement, respect for human rights?" If Soviet foreign policy was sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of the 1917 generation knew well that too much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, p. 174) noted: "The complex relationship between war and revolution, which had almost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its demise in 1917, was a relationship of which Stalin was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself." Stalin did all he could to avoid war with Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999). Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the "main adversary." Faced with unfavourable odds, they tended to withdraw (from Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan). Diversionary tension must fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that capitalism, because of its tendency to give rise to democratic structures and political competition, has been more open to diversionary wars than other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin this conclusion also imply that such wars would generally be small scale and short lived, and the circumstances that give rise to them would be exceptional or transient. We should place this in the wider context of the "democratic peace." As Levy (1988) wrote: "Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other … This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." Since all liberal democracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is a finding of deep relevance.

=Relations=

1. as they depend on each other on multiple levels. That~’s 1nc Gaytan 12

====New administration promises ====

\*\*Seelke ~’13\*\*

~~[Clare, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, "Mexico~’s New Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in US-Mexican Relations," Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2013~~]

[[http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf-http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf]]

U.S.-Mexican relations grew closer during the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012) as a ¶ result of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral security effort for which Congress has provided %241.9 ¶ billion. Some Members of Congress may be concerned about whether bilateral relations, ¶ particularly security cooperation, may suffer now that the party controlling the presidency has ¶ changed. Although the transition from PAN to PRI rule is unlikely to result in seismic shifts in ¶ bilateral relations, a PRI government may emphasize economic issues more than security matters. ¶ President Peña Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a ¶ stronger emphasis on reducing violent crime in Mexico than on combating drug trafficking; what ¶ that cooperation will look like remains to be seen. He has also expressed support for increased ¶ bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic and energy cooperation.

\*\*====Expanding education partnership====\*\*

\*\*Baker ~’13 ~~[Celia, Journalist, "US-Mexico Education Partnership Announced," Deseret News, May 6, 2013~~]\*\*

[[http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865579517/US-Mexico-education-partnership-announced.html?pg=all-http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865579517/US-Mexico-education-partnership-announced.html?pg=all]]

\*\*U.S. President Barack \*\*Obama and\*\* Mexico~’s president, \*\*Pena Nieto\*\*, have \*\*announced a partnership to expand economic opportunities\*\* for citizens of both countries \*\*and to develop a 21st-century work force for mutual economic prosperity\*\*, according to a May 2 statement from the U.S. State Department. Through \*\*a new\*\* \*\*Forum on Higher Education\*\*, \*\*Innovation, and Research\*\*, the U.S. and Mexican governments \*\*will encourage broader access to quality post-secondary education for traditionally under-served groups\*\*, especially in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. They will also expand educational exchanges and share best practices in higher education and innovation, the statement said. \*\*The forum~’s mission is to bring together government agency counterparts from Mexico and the U.S. to deepen cooperation on higher education, innovation and research\*\*. It will also draw on the expertise of the higher education communities in both countries, according to the State Department\*\*. More than 18,000 Mexican and U.S. university students study in each other~’s countries annually\*\*. The Mexico-U.S. Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange (COMEXUS) oversees the Fulbright-Garcia Robles Scholarship Program, the flagship program in U.S.-Mexico academic exchanges. Under this program, more than 4,000 Mexicans and Americans have participated in bilateral exchange programs since 1990. \*\*The new Forum on Higher Education, Innovation, and Research plans to start meeting this year and bring together government, academic and civil society to develop a shared vision on educational cooperation\*\*, the Wall Street Journal~’s Washington Wire blog said. Obama traveled to Mexico City at Nieto~’s invitation for meetings that culminated in the announcement of the education initiative. The discussions also included economic interests and citizen security, but no security agreements were announced, The New York Times reported.\*\*

\*\*====Mexico trust level with US is high====\*\*

\*\*Shirk ~’13\*\*

\*\*~~[Jason, Associate professor of political science, "US-Mexico Relations Complicated, Conditioned by Drug War," a statement from Shirk in an interview with host Scott Simon, NPR, May 4, 2013~~]\*\*

[[http://www.npr.org/2013/05/04/181053775/u-s-mexico-relations-complicated-conditioned-by-drug-war-http://www.npr.org/2013/05/04/181053775/u-s-mexico-relations-complicated-conditioned-by-drug-war]]

\*\*In the last 12 years, \*\*and especially the last six years, have really been a high-water mark in U.S.-Mexico collaboration\*\*, particularly on security issues. \*\*Levels of trust are so high\*\* that we \*\*have had the opportunity to fly drones in Mexico\*\*, we have agents operating in direct collaboration with their Mexican counterparts, we~’ve seen record levels of extradition. So, \*\*the collaboration is at a much higher level of intensity than we~’ve ever seen before\*\* - or has been, at least over the last six years or so.\*\*

====Common interests====

\*\*O~’Neil ~’13- \*\*senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

(Shannon K., a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, March/April 2013, [[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138818/shannon-k-oneil/mexico-makes-it-http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138818/shannon-k-oneil/mexico-makes-it]] "Mexico makes it")

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico~’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico~’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor.¶ For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm~’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico~’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.